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Abstract
This paper presents a model of endogenous price formation where
disequilibrium trading is possible. The purpose of the model is to
examine whether an economy can get stuck away from Walrasian equilibrium.
This is done by examining the class of Nash equilibria of the model.
This class is very large and includes many inefficient, i.e. Keynesian,
equilibria. When attention is restricted to a subclass of these
equilibria, where price setters know the true consequences of altering
their price signals, it is shown that they correspond to Walrasian
equilibria and must exist in large economies.

Walrasian or Keynesian Equilibrium: A Game Theoretic Approach
Lanny Arvan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
I. Introduction
The intent of this paper is twofold. First, we vjould like to
construct a formal model in which the forces pushing an economy in
disequilibrium are explained directly from individual optimizing
behavior. Second, using this formal model, vre would like to determine
whether an economy can get stuck away from Walrasian equilibrium.
In order to accomplish our first purpose, our model must allow
for actual trading in disequilibrium. The standard general equilibrium
model, as characterized by Debreu's Theory of Value [ ], does not
allow for disequilibrium trading. Neither do analagous Keynesian
nxjdels such as Benassy [ ] and Dreze [ ]. In these Keynesian models,
trades can only occur if the relevant quantity constraints are set at
their equilibrium levels. Our model is a market game. Trading can
occur without concern for any equilibrium consistency requirement. We
restrict our attention to noncooperative play of the game in order to
focus on competitive behavior. To achieve our second goal we v;ill
examine the Nash equilibria of our game and see if they coincide with
Walrasian equilibria.
The model provides a rudimentary theory of price formation. The
terms of trade are set by the agents themselves. In some sense our
model generalizes the monopolistic competition model of Negishi [ ]
and the conjectural equilibria models of Hahn [ ]. The key difference
is that in our model all agents can set price. In these other models
this capability is restricted to agents on one side of the market.
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In Hahn's model this capability is further restricted so that only
agents rationed at the prevailing price can signal their own price.
Our view is that the ability to signal price is a technical rather
than strategic capability. All agents should possess such a capability
though signaling costs may vary across agents. On the other hand, the
ability to command a certain volume of trade at a given price is a
strategic capability which depends on the behavior of others.
When every agent can set a price there is no reason why a single
price must prevail in any market. Our model has to describe how buyers
and sellers are paired when there is dispersion of price signals. Tvro
possible ways of doing this are as follows. The market may queue
buyers and sellers on the basis of their price offers. Some examples
of models of this sort are given by Dubey [ ] and Dubey and Shubik
[ ]. Another possibility is that agents recognize each other via the
price signal. This may entail some cost by either the price setter or
the price taker. In this case, when a seller sets a price and a buyer
wants to buy at that price, the buyer sends a buy signal directly to
that seller. This second method is somewhat at odds with the general
equilibrium model. There, agents are virtually anonymous. Each agent
trades with an amorphous market. However, this second method is
compatible with real world phenomena such as advertising and search.
In addition, the first method rules out the possibility that infra-
marginal traders on one side of the market are paired with extra-
marginal traders on the other side of the market. This possibility
should not be ruled out a priori when considering why economies may
get stuck away from Walrasian equilibrium.
-3-
A major accomplishment of our model is that it incorporates
endogenous price setting when agents are symmetric with regard to
their signaling capabilities. The model is a two stage model. In
all equilibrium models where agents are not distinguished by their
signaling capabilities and in all the pricing games which we are
aware of there is simultaneous signaling. In equilibrium models,
agents choose their signals on the basis of observed market signals,
e.g., prices and/or quantity constraits. These market signals are,
in turn, generated by the joint signals of the agents. Equilibrium
models do not come to grips with this apparent chicken-and-egg
problem. In our model, we want to capture the intuition that, by
altering his price signal, an agent can affect the volume of his
trade. This agent must regard his price signal as informational in-
put to others who contemplate trading with him. The agent must con-
sider the relative merits of setting more favorable terms of trade
versus inducing a greater volume of trade. The price setter acts as
a monopolist (monopsonist) . In the first stage of our model each
agent sets prices. In the second stage agents signal trades at the
prices already set.
Our model involves more elaborate behavior than is permitted in
equilibrium models. Agents in the second stage signal trades to
particular agents. The size of an agent's second stage signal in-
creases with the number of agents in the economy. Note that we do
not account for transaction costs in our model. When these costs are
present it is likely that the optimal strategy for agents requires
restricting the size of the second period signal. A more important
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point is that, when viewing our game in normal form, elements of an
agent's strategy space include entire reaction functions. These func-
tions determine the volume of trade signaled in stage two as the price
signals in stage one vary. Since our strategy spaces are function
spaces, analysis of the game is quite involved. There are technical
problems which force us to illustrate existence of Nash equilibrium
via construction rather than via the standard fixed point approach.
We have chosen to restrict our attention to a monetized economy.
The primary purpose of money in the model is as a medium of exchange.
All price signals are exchange ratios of goods in terms of money.
This restricts the number of active markets. An agent has to monetize
his entire demand signal but the agent does not have to be concerned
whether his cash will be accepted as a means of payment. This leads
to an important question that must be resolved in disequilibrium
models. What are the appropriate constraints on signaled trades?
In disequilibrium, an agent may anticipate receipts which are, in fact,
not forthcoming. If the agent does not have enough cash reserves to
finance his already expressed demand, then the agent is bankrupt.
Something must be done to resolve this difficulty.
An extreme Keynesian solution is to restrict signals so that the
resulting trades yield feasible allocations regardless of which sig-
naled trades actually occur. Under this type of constraint the value
of an agent's demand signal is bounded by cash on hand. This is
severe. In fairness however, the constraint is so severe only because
it is cast in a static model. In a dynamic model where an agent has
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some choice over the timing of receipts and expenditures, such a
constraint on instantaneous expenditures may not be very harsh.
In our model this type of contraint produces an additional dif-
ficulty. In any market both buyers and sellers will be setting a
price. Price setting entails a cononitment to a certain volume of
trade. Suppose all agents set the Walrasian price in some market.
What is to prevent any single agent the perception of market power?
When a seller holds up on his sales at the Walrasian price, some un-
satisfied demand should be created. This seller should perceive that
there will be some demand at prices above the Walrasian price. In
spite of sales at above the Walrasian price, the seller may desire to
sell additional amounts at the Walrasian price. The more that is sold
at the Walrasian price, the less will be demanded at the price the
seller has set. Competitive equilibrium survives as an equilibrium
of our model if, whenever the seller sells any amount at any price
above the Walrasian price, he wishes to sell more than he actually
is selling at the Walrasian price. Because the seller's sell signal
at the Walrasian price occurs in stage two, he does not perceive an
effect that this signal has on the demand at his price. However,
because we are insisting on a Nash equilibrium solution, the buyers'
demand at the seller's price is a function of how much the seller
sells at the Walrasian price. In equilibrium there is no demand at
the sellers price so the seller is, in effect, a price taker at the
Walrasian price. Crucial to the existence of equilibrium is a resid-
ual volume of demand signal at the Walrasian price. The seller can
fulfill his desired sales at the Walrasian price when he does not sell
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as much as he wants at the price he has set. When agents are re-
stricted so that the total value of demand they have signaled, at
both the prices they and others have set is bounded by cash on
hand, this residual volume of demand signal may not be present. For
an elaboration of this point see Arvan [ ].
We adopt another approach. We assume there is an institutional
rule which alters actual trades when they would yield individually
infeasible allocations. The rule does not affect trades when indi-
vidual feasibility is already guaranteed. Note that such a rule alters
trades of creditors of the bankrupt agent as well as the trades of the
bankrupt agent himself. Though we do not concern ourselves with this
issue here, the model seems to be appropriate for an investigation
how, and under what circumstances, demand signals will be effective
when they are not backed by ready cash. Such considerations may also
provide a motive for financial intermediation. There are technical
problems v/ith showing existence of Nash equilibrium in the stage two
subgame under such a rule. These problems arise because an agent's
signaled trades at other agents' prices may affect the feasibility of
someone else's allocation vjhich, under this rule, may alter the trades
that the original agent partakes in at the prices he has set. This
indirect effect may be nonlinear. An agent may rationally perceive
that his set of potential trades is not convex. This problem is not
insurmountable. For a solution see Arvan [ ].
Because disequilibrium trading is permitted, signaled trades will
not, in general, coincide with actual trades. We would like to view
the rationing process itself as a competition. Agents spend scarce
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resources to promote their trading interests. In Walrasian equilib-
rium there is no reason to utilize resources for this purpose. I'/hen
comparing allocations obtained under perfectly competitive versus
disequilibrium models, we must make allowance for the fact that the
spending of resources to promote trading is likely to have a nonneutral
effect on the equilibrium of the economy. To avoid this problem in
our model, we let actual trades be a function only of signaled trades.
This lends an air of unreality to the model but it is consistent with
2
the Keynesian, general equilibrium approach. We do allow, however,
for an agent to have some influence on his quantity constraint via his
3
own quantity signal,
II. The Formal Model
Consider an economy with K nonmonetary goods indexed by k. A
bundle of goods is represented by x. There are N agents indexed by
n. Each agent has utility u (x,m),u : IR -»• IR, where m is an
amount of the monetary commodity. Assume u is strictly quasiconcave
and increasing for each n. Each n has an endowment of goods,
w = (w , ...,w ), and an endowment of money, m . Assume w € ir and
1 IS- +
m S IR . Trade is not necessary for sur-'/ival. Call all such economies
classical exchange economies.
Now consider the following price game. There are two stages in
this game. Stages are indexed with either a one or two. The idea is
that stage two is "later" than stage one. During stage one, agents
set prices for the nonmonetary goods in terms of the money commodity.
Agent n's action during stage one is a = (p ,q ) where p S IR and
q S {1,-1} . These symbols have the following interpretation, p, is
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the price n sets for good k. If q = 1 then n is setting a buy signal
for good k. If q = -1 then n is setting a sell signal for good k.
Let a = Xa . In stage two, a is public knowledge.
n
In stage two agent n sends the price taking signal
«n , n n n« n <- , „K n _ ,.^n , n « . , ^
6 = (s ,t ,...t )s e IR . s > only if q = 1.
^v^
< only if
q, = -1. t . ^ IR for each i and t ^0. t is the quantity signal
n sends to agent i. t ., > only if q = -1. t ., < only if q = 1.
In words, n signals to buy from i units of k(t., > 0) only if i signals
to sell units of k(q, = -1) , and vice versa. Let 3 = X0 , B/n = X S ,
n i=y*n
t. = Zt^, t = Xt., t,/n = t-t^ and t/n = Xt./n.
X 2. . i' i i .1
n X X
The next step is to describe transactions. Assume individual
feasibility is not an issue. Let y, be the actual transaction made by
agent n as a price setter for good k. The rules governing y are:
y^=min(s;;. - t^^^) if sj > 0.
= max(s,
,
- t
,
) xf s, < 0.
k' nk k
= if sf = 0.k
This is the most obvious rationing rule. Each price setter is a
monopolist (monopsonist) for the good that he has set the price. As
such, the magnitude of his trade is the minimum of supply and demand.
For price takers, the actual transaction agent n makes with price
setter i is z . The rules governing z. are a little harder to formulate,
because the trades must be split among all price takers. Consider the
class, T, of rationing rules specified by the following properties.
T e T and write z^ = T(s^,t^j^/n,t" ) . Then:
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(2) I4ll|t"^l
(3) When t , > 0, i) T is nondecreasing in t and ii) T
is decreasing in s, , t., /n.
(4) When t^, > 0, i) T is concave in t° , and ii) T is
convex in t
.,
/n.ik —
(5) T does not favor buyers or sellers, i.e.,
. ^(^''^ik/^'^ik^ = -^(-^'-'^ik^^'-^ic^
(6) T is continuous
(7) Price taking transactions are "consistent" with price
setting transactions, i.e.,
y, = Zz., . In particulark ik
n
n n
.^ I
ii
^ I
i|
^ik = 'ik ^^ l\l ' 1^1 •
(8) T is nondiscriminatory. If t., /n = t , /j and t ., = t.. ,
then z ., = z ., .ik ik
Note that the nondiscriminatory property is not assumed by Benassy or
Dreze. The resulting commodity bundle for agent n after stages one
and two is :
,n, n,„n n nn in. ..^
..i.^ ^-n(w + y + Ez , m - p y - Ip z ). Note that z =0.
i i
°
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To complete the description of our game we must specify the
strategy spaces. This amounts to specifying constraints on the stage
two signals. The constraints on agent n in stage two are given by
(9) - (14) below.
(9) -sJlw^Vk
(10) EpJ max(0,sj) £ c"(a)
k
(11) 11- min(0,t" ) <_w^
il^ k
Ik k
(12) I EpJ max(t'?. ,0) lC^(a)
iTb k ^
^ ^
(13) s^qJ^O Vk
(14) t^j^ qj 10 Vi^.k
The set of all permissable stage two signals will be denoted as B (a).
Discussion ; These constraints do the following. The set of signals
allowed is compact. If the transaction rule is continuous this means
that given B/n an optimal signal will exist for agent n. Furthermore,
if trades are increasing in signals then bounding signals is necessary
for there to be an optimal signal in equilibrium with rationing. An
objection may be raised that when the transaction rule itself generates
feasible allocations, agents should not be constrained at all in their
signals. Two potential interpretations of these constraints mute this
criticism. First, signaling itself may be costly. These costs, e.g.,
search and advertisement costs, do influence the extent of trade in
actuality. The signal constraints can be taken as a prox>' for these
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costs. \^ile it may be more realistic to model such costs explicitly,
doing so, in effect, introduces new commodities and thereby alters
equilibrium. The constraints as specified do not. This makes it
easier to compare equilibria tmder various assumptions about informa-
tion and strategy. The second interpretation has to do with penalties
due to bankruptcy or short selling. Such penalties should deter overly
optimistic signaling in a world of imperfect or incomplete information.
The signaling constraints can be thought of as proxies for these
penalties. In this case, however, since bankruptcy and equilibrium
are not compatible, there is less justification for wanting a proxy
rather than explicit penalties. However, in a world where individuals
have positive subjective probabilities of defaulting on their commit-
ments and where gains from trade are bounded for the individual, one
would expect the magnitude of optimal signals to stay within certain
limits.
As to the constraints themselves the following should be noted.
Stage one signals do not impinge on stage two signals except through
the consistency constraints, (13) and (14). In both price setting and
price taking, supply signals have no influence on the demand signal
constraint. The number C (a) is presumed to be large enough so that
s
Walrasian trades can be signalled. A possible value of C (a) is the
value of n's endowment capitalized at the prices he has set. A
similar interpretation can be made for C (a) . Supply signal constraints
"force" the price taking seller, who is rationed in trading with agent
i, to reduce his supply signal to agent j. Rationing forces agents
to "spend" their signals. Hence, an optimal signal is determined by
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both the transaction rule and the signal constraints. This is both
a departure and a generalization of the fixed quantity constraint
models. The constraint on signals "causes" the monopolist's demand
curve to be more elastic than it otherwise would be at the competitive
equilibrium price.
Now we must account for individual feasibility. Below, 2,, isik
the actual trade after the feasibility rule is applied, v = - E i
The feasibility rule is given by the following problem
. - r. / n n .2
maximize - I (z^, -t., )
._, , ik ik
{z., : n=l,...,N; i=l, . . .N,i?b;
k^l y • • • f Ki
subject to:
(15) 2°^ t^^ >_0 Vn,i?ha,k
(16) |z^| 1 |T(sJ.t.j^/n,t^)| Vn,i?^n,k '
(17) -min(qj,0) [max(s^,-t^j^) + I z^ + "^1 1 ^n,k
(18) m° - r (p^ • z^ - p" • z^) > Vn.
., i n —ifn
The constraint set is nonempty if the original endowment is
feasible. Then the zero trade vector satisfies all the constraints.
The constraint set is closed and convex since all constraints are weak
linear constraints. The family of constraints denoted (16) guarantees
boundedness of the constraint set. The objective function is strictly
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concave. Consequently, there Is a unique maximum so the trade rule
is well specified. For a fixed, the constraint set is continuous in
6 since T is a continuous function and since each constraint is linear
in the vector z. Thus, trades are continuous in B by the Berge maximum
principle.
If the family of constraints denoted by (17) and (18), the "fea-
sibility constraints," are satisfied by z ., = T(s ,t., /n,t )Vn,i7%,k,
then the trade rule coincides with the previous scheme.
This is a complete description of our model. We proceed to solu-
tions. Let 3/n(g ) be the aggregate price taking signal excluding
n*
agent n, when the joint price taking signal is 3. Let B (a,6/n) be
the optimal stage two correspondence of agent n given ce and B/n.
Definition 1 ; For fixed a, B* is a Price Taking Nash Equilibrium,
P.T.N.E., if b"*S B"*(a,B/n(B*)) Vn. Let B*(a) be the set of all
P.T.N.E. given the stage one signal a.
Theorem 1 ; B*(a) 4- <^>
Proof ; See Arvan [ ]
.
Theorem 2 : The correspondence B*( ) is u.s.c. in a.
Proof : See Arvan [ ]
The next step is to proceed to solutions of the overall game, A
strategy in the overall game for agent n is a stage one signal, a
,
and a function B ( ) , which chooses a stage two signal given the
joint period one signal such that B (a) € B (a) for all possible a.
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Definltlon 2 : A Nash equilibrium of the overall game, N.E., is a
vector a*, and a 'rector of price taking functions,
B*( ), 9 Vn, v'^(a*,3/n(e*(a*)),B'^*) =
sup v''((a*/n.a''), &/n(^*(.a* /n,a'))
,
B''(ct*/n,a'')) .
a",3^( )
V is the indirect utility function of agent n.
Note : At a N.E., 6^ (a*) € B^ (a*, 6/n (6*(a*) ) . In other words, at a
Nash equilibrium of the overall game, the price taking functions applied
to the stage one signals give rise to a P.T.N.E.
The class of Nash equilibria is so large that for any stage one
signal, a, there is a corresponding N.E. This N.E. is constructed as
follows. Let 6(a) e B*(a) and for all n let 6/n(a/n,a") = if
a 7^ a . In this N.E. when agent n alters his price signal, no trade
occurs. Furthermore, in the P.T.N.E. at a. each agent does at least
as well as at his endowment, since no trade is always a possible second
stage signal.
It is debatable whether the existence of these N.E. gives credence
to the Keynesian view. ^Jhen interpreting the function 6/n as n's stage
one expectation of everyone else's stage two signal, these equilibria
exist only because agents have "unreasonable" expectations about trading
opportunities at other than equilibrium prices. It is difficult to give
meaning to the "reasonableness" of expectations. However, we can
examine the extreme case of rational expectations. Within the context
of this model, the rational expectations case is equivalent to subgame
perfection of the equilibrium. A subgame perfect N.E. is a N.E.,
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(a*,e*), such that 6*(a) e B*(a) for all a. Note that there always
exists a trivial P.T.N.E., 0=0. When price setters signal a zero
volume of trade there is no reason for price takers to signal other
than zero and hence no reason for price setters to signal other than
zero. The rest of the paper is devoted to studying the nature and
existence of nontrivial, sub game perfect N.E.
III. The Pricing Game for K = 1
In this special case it is a simple matter to show that a competi-
tive equilibrium, C.E., can be supported by a subgame perfect N.E. Let
p* be a C.E. price. If each agent signals p* in stage one then all non-
trivial P.T.N.E. at this stage one signal yield the C.E. allocation.
Suppose an agent sets a price that is more favorable to him than p*
while everyone else signals p*. There is a P.T.N.E. where no agent
trades with this original agent and the C.E. allocation is attained.
In this P.T.N.E. the original agent acts as a price taker at the C.E.
price. In this equilibrium no agent has monopoly power.
A more interesting question to ask is the following. Do there
exist P.T.N.E. where a seller, j, signals p-* > p* and where j does
better than by pricing at p*? Sometimes such P.T.N.E. exist. This is
illustrated in the case N = 2 via an Edgeworth box diagram. Suppose agent
1 is the buyer and agent 2 is the seller. We assume that each n signals
s = X (p ) , where x is the net, excess demand function of agent n.
n n
1 2
The price setting signals p and p determine line segments from the endow-
ment point with negative slope. These segments are such that the projection
onto the x axis has length |s |n=l,2 while the projection onto the y axis
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has length p |s [n=l,2. Given (p ,s ) and (p ,s ) the set of all pos-
sible trades yields the allocations which lie in the parallelogram,
including Interior, determined by these segments.
Figure 1
A P.T.N.E. yields an allocation in the parallelogram where further
movement by agent 1 in the direction of 2's price offer makes 1 worse
2
off. If 1 is buying at p it must also be that a movement in the
opposite direction of 2's price offer also makes 1 worse off. 2 must
be in a similar position with regard to I's offer. A P.T.N.E. yielding
allocations in the interior of the parallelogram must be on I's income
2 1
expansion path at p and on 2's income expansion path at p . It is
-17-
2
possible that there are P.T.N.E. where 1 buys nothing at p or where
2 sells nothing at p . These boundary P.T.N.E. do not necessarily
correspond to intersections of the expansion paths. For instance, if
2 sells nothing at p in a P.T.N.E., then it may be that 2 has positive
net demand at p .
It is possible for there to be 1) only a single boundary P.T.N.E.
allocation, 2) both interior and boundary P.T.N.E. allocations, and 3)
only interior P.T.N.E. allocations. Figure 2 illustrates the case
with both boundary and interior P.T.N.E. allocations. The figure
demonstrates that the P.T.N.E. correspondence is not necessarily con-
vex and need not be l.s.c. This last point is illustrated at the
interior P.T.N.E. allocation which is a tangency point of the two in-
12 2 1
come expansion paths, I (p ) and I (p ).
In the general case with K ^ 1, a proof of the existence of a sub-
game perfect N.E. using a standard fixed point argument is not appro-
priate. In fact no such equilibrium may exist. With more than one
nonmonetary good, a seller setting a price higher than the equilibrium
price may force buyers to buy from him at his price by "seeding"
demand, i.e, by offering a slightly lower than equilibrium price in
a complementary market.
Figure 2
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A different approach is taken here. Seeding as a pricing strategy
is rational only if, when looking at the market where j charges above
the equilibrium price, there exists a P.T.N.E. where j does- better than
at the competitive equilibrium. It will be argued that as the market
share of any agent falls, via replication of the economy, the power to
act manopolistically in the above sense also falls. At some market
share level greater than zero, no agent has any monopoly power. The
market share level where this occurs depends on the utility functions
and endowments of all agents in the original economy. In the case
where all goods are gross substitutes, seeding is not a rational
strategy. No agent can act monopolistically even if the agent is the
sole seller of a particular good.
Assume agent 1 sets p = p* and s = x^ (p*) while agent 2 sets
2 2 2
p > p* and s = x„(p ). In this case one P.T.N.E. is12 1
t„ = 0,t = x„(p*) = -s . This is the P.T.N.E. which supports the
2 12
C.E. If I (p*) intersects I (p ) within the parallelogram, as in
Figure 3, there is a P.T.N.E. where 2 does better than he does in the
C.E. This intersection point is further out than the C.E. allocation
2
on I (p*) . There may also be a boundary P.T.N.E. where agent 2 sells
1 1 '^
nothing at p*. Raising p shifts the I (p ) curve up continuously.
2
The I (p*) curve cannot have slope less than or equal to -p*. It
is evident that when there are interior P.T.N.E., agent 2 can raise
2
p further to yield a boundary P.T.N.E.
-19-
Figure 3
It is easy to see that at such a boundary P.T.N.E. allocation, I's
2
offer curve must lie on or below I (p*) . In fact, this must also be
true for an interior P.T.N.E. Figure 4 presents an inconsistent
picture showing why this must be the case. Suppose, in Figure 4, that
the segment from w to A represents the effect of 2 selling at p*
Figure 4
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when the final allocation ends up at B. Let C be the intersection
of segment AB and I's offer curve. If 2 signals as indicated, then
1 can obtain point C. The segment wC is less steep than the segment
AB. Hence at the price for which C is optimal for agent 1, B is
affordable. Consequently C is preferred by 1 to B. Therefore B can-
12 12 2
not lie on I (p ) . The intersection of I (p ) and I (p*) must lie
outside the parallelogram. It is evident that when I's offer curve
2
lies below I (p*) that a P.T.N.E. exists where 2 sells nothing at p*.
Notation ; Let E be an exchange economy and rE a replication economy
of E. Denote by i, the hth buyer of type i and by j, the hth seller
of type j, h = 1,2, ...r.
Theorem 3 : Let E be a classical exchange economy for K = 1. Let p*
be a C.E. price for E and let p > p*. Assume each agent's utility
function is different iable in a neighborhood of his C.E. allocation.
Then there exists a natural number r, such that for r >_ r, in the
economy rE if any seller j, signals p = p while all other agents set
price at p*, then in no P.T.N.E. does any agent buy at p.
The intuition behind the theorem is as follows. As a result of
the curvature and nondiscriminatory properties of the rationing rule,
all agents approximately attain their C.E. allocations as r gets large.
Since utility functions are continuously differentiable near the C.E.
allocations, individual demands at above the C.E. price beocne zero
for r large enough.
This result does not generalize if some type of buyer i has
"kinked" indifference curves. In this case it is possible to
-21-
construct examples Vi-here buyers have nonzero demand at p, even for
large r, and where the aggregate demand at p is bounded away from
zero for all r. These examples are pathological in the sense that the
C.E. allocation for these buyers must be at a kink. These kinks occur
on a closed set with empty interior in the consumption set. However,
it should be noted that when such pathologies arise, schemes such as
proportional rationing do not make the aggregate demand at p converge
to zero. —
If a seller perceives gains by deviating from p* in replica-
tion economies, it is evident that these gains must be small and are
decreasing in r. In fact, for sufficiently large economies, no gains
exist. This is true because the slope of the "residual offer curve"
approaches -p* as r gets large. In large economies, the "residual
offer curve" lies above the deviating agent's income expansion curve.
This follows because a large number of agents must be rationed at the
C.E. price. Since these agents approximately attain their C.E. alloca-
tions, their demand at above the C.E. price is determined principally
by the substitution effect. The following theorem results.
Theorem 4 : Let E be a classical exchange economy for K = 1. Let p*
be a C.E. price for E. Assume the utility functions of all agents
are twice continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the C.E.
allocation. Then there exists a natural number r, such that for
r >_ r, in the economy rE, if a single agent, n, sets a price different
from p* while all other agents signal p*, then in no P.T.N.E. does n
do better than in the C.E. at p*.
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IV. The Pricing Game for Arbitrary K
We would like to show that a result analagous to theorem 4 holds.
We must show that seeding ceases to be profitable in large economies.
The key to the result is that an agent cannot seed in a discriminatory
manner. The effect of seeding on any particular agent gets small as
the economy gets large. To see how the result is shown, imagine that
agent n seeds in some market. Now look at any other market and view
it as an economy with K = 1. Seeding can be thought of as creating a
shift parameter in the utility functions. Since this shift effect
gets small in large economies, the P.T.N. E. of these seeded economies
converge uniformly to the P.T.N. E. of the unseeded economy. Theorem
4 holds for this unseeded, one market economy. Hence, seeding is less
profitable than nonseeding. Our main theorem is:
Theorem 5 ; Let E be a classical exchange economy for arbitrar>' K. Let
p* be a C.E. price vector for E. Assume the utility functions of all
agents are twice continuously different iable in a neighborhood of the
C.E. allocation. Then there exists a natural number r, such that for
r >_ r, in the economy rE, if a single agent n sets a price different
from p* while all other agents signal p*, then in no P.T.N.E. does n
do better than in the C.E. at p*.
Corollary : If all the conditions of theorem 5 are satisifed then, for
the economy rE, a subgame perfect N.E. exists which supports the C.E.
at p*.
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V. Extensions
The results we have obtained do not resolve the Keynesian-Walrasian
debate. However, a framework was created which suggests several issues
whose solution should shed light on the matter. Most of these solutions
are likely to be extremely difficult to attain. We merely list the is-
sues here.
First, we restricted our attention to P.T.N.E. Given the price
signals, buyers and sellers matched themselves optimally. If we con-
cerned ourselves with this matching problem, we would be forced to
recognize that bottlenecks can occur even if prices are set at their
Walrasian levels. The possibility of bottlenecks creates monopoly
power. Is such power transient or is it destabilizing?
Second, our model is static. A dynamic version is needed. In
a dynamic version we must address the possibility that current signals
are sent not just to promote current trade but also to influence future
behavior. We must come to grips with the question, how rational are
our agents? We must also concern ourselves with issues such as stock
valuation, borrowing and lending, and long term contracting.
The most promising unexplored area seems to be the incorporation
of signaling costs into the model. A static framework can be main-
tained for this purpose. In particular, it would be of great interest
to see if nonWalrasian allocations are supportable by nontrivial, sub-
game perfect equilibria, when signaling is costly.
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Footnotes
This point is discussed in Shapley-Shubik [ ]. In a barter
economy out of equilibrium, an agent may be willing to offer apparently
inconsistent exchange ratios. This inconsistency is accounted for by
the perception that some goods will be more acceptable as a means of
payment
.
2
Both Benassy [ ] and Dreze [ ] generate quantity constraints
as a function of the joint excess demand signal.
3
For example, a proportional rationing scheme is possible under
our model.
4
In an earlier version of this model, Arvan [ ], agents com-
mitted themselves to a volume of trade in stage one. In this formu-
lation, the agent who alters his price could not be shut out by the
other agents. This restricted the class of N.E. somewhat. However,
this formulation had to be rejected due to difficulties with existence
of P.T.N.E.
Rigorous proofs of theorems 4 and 5 can be found in Arvan [ ],
-25-
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